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RESUMEN
Este trabajo proporciona una visión ordinal de la inequidad horizontal, basada en el criterio de
Lorenz asociado a las distribuciones de la renta después de impuestos y  a la distribución de la renta
estimada no paramétricamente (mediante un estimador biestocástico) de referencia. Además, se
establece el principio de transferencias horizontales, requisito mínimo que toda medida de
desigualdad horizontal debería cumplir. El enfoque ordinal de la inequidad horizontal propuesto es
consistente con dicho principio. Se descompone igualmente la redistribución total de un sistema
fiscal en el componente vertical y horizontal, dentro de un marco cardinal. Otras descomposiciones
propuestas en la literatura aparecen como casos particulares de esta metodología.
Palabras clave: redistribución vertical, desigualdad horizontal, bienestar social, estimación
no paramétrica.
ABSTRACT
We provide a partial ordering view of horizontal inequity (henceforth HI), based on the Lorenz
criterion, associated with different post-tax income distributions and a (bistochastic) non-
parametric estimated benchmark distribution. As a consequence, several measures consistent with
the Lorenz criterion can be rationalized. In addition, we establish the so-called horizontal inequity
transfer principle, which imposes a normative minimum requirement that any HI measure must
satisfy. Our proposed HI ordering is consistent with this principle. Moreover, we adopt a cardinal
view to decompose the total effect of a tax system into a welfare gain due to HI-free income
redistribution and a welfare loss due to HI, without any additive decomposable restriction on the
indices. Hence, more robust tests can be applied. Other decompositions in the literature are seen
as particular cases.
Keywords: vertical redistribution, horizontal inequity, social welfare, non-parametric
estimation.
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1. Introduction
The horizontal equity principle states that equals should be treated equally (see, for
example, Feldstein, 1976). Nevertheless, a principle as simple as this has generated a long list
of indices to measure the absence of horizontal equity. This is primarily because of the
difficulty of finding individuals exactly equal with respect to their equivalent incomes.
Therefore, the principle of horizontal equity should be interpreted in a much less restrictive
way to enable the measurement of the horizontal inequity (HI) derived from any tax system.
There are two main alternative approaches for measuring HI, each corresponding to a
different interpretation of this concept. Reranking analysis focuses on the measurement of the
HI induced by the transition from the pre-tax to the post-tax distribution of income (see, for
example, Atkinson, 1980; Plotnick, 1981; King, 1983; Duclos, 1993). This approach may be
criticized (see, for example, Aronson et al., 1994), as reranking is a sufficient, but not a
necessary, condition for HI to exist. Alternative analyses concentrate on the different
treatments received by uniform or similar individuals (Berliant and Strauss, 1985; Camarero
et al., 1993; Aronson et al., 1994; Pazos et al., 1995; Lambert and Ramos, 1997; Salas,
2002). A major deficiency of these indices is that similar individuals are selected by dividing
individuals' incomes into arbitrary intervals. In empirical work, the problem of this ad hoc
definition is reduced through a bandwidth sensitivity analysis. In the context of the
decomposition of Aronson et al. (1994), van de Ven et al. (2001) interpret the size of the
disjoint intervals. An alternative solution to the arbitrary definition of intervals is the use of
non-parametric techniques, as in Lambert and Parker (1997), Duclos and Lambert (2000) and
Ramos and Lambert (2002).
In all cases, reranking and close-equals approaches make use of particular indices to
measure HI, which implies a cardinal approach to the measurement of HI. Instead, we
provide a partial ordering view of horizontal inequity. In particular, we establish a partial HI
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ordering between different post-tax income distributions, given the same pre-tax distribution,
based on the Lorenz criterion. As a consequence, several measures consistent with the Lorenz
criterion can be rationalized.
First, we apply non-parametric regression techniques to identify the empirical
relationship between pre- and post-tax equivalized incomes. This estimation allows us to
identify areas of HI within the income distribution, because in the absence of HI every data
point will lie on the fitted line. Therefore, the theoretical income distribution will be used as a
benchmark to discriminate between the vertical and horizontal components of the total
redistribution effect of the tax system. Among all possible non-parametric regression
methods, we adopt the bistochastic non-parametric estimator, which guarantees the Lorenz
dominance of the theoretical income distribution over the observed post-tax distribution.
Then, HI is measured according to the distance between the estimated and the actual post-tax
income Lorenz curves. As a consequence, partial HI orderings between different post-tax
income distributions, given the same pre-tax distribution, can be established. This approach
allows us to measure HI using a variety of S-convex indices instead of a particular inequality
index.
In addition, we establish the so-called horizontal inequity transfer principle, which
imposes a normative minimum requirement that any HI measure must satisfy. Our proposed
HI ordering is consistent with this principle. In fact, the estimated theoretical distribution,
given a particular non-parametric technique, will be the most equitable post-tax equivalent
income distribution obtainable under a set of horizontal inequity reducing transfers.
The non-parametric approach allows us to provide a local-to-global perspective through
the bandwidth window, following Musgrave’s (1990) recommendation of devising a local
measure and then aggregating it. Furthermore, the choice of similar individuals is justified in
the paper by an economic interpretation of the bandwidth.
E2004/013
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Moreover, we generalize the decompositions of the total redistributive effect (RE) of a
tax system proposed in the literature. Our approach has two advantages. First, we need not
restrict our measurement to the use of additively decomposable inequality indices. For
example, Aronson et al. (1994) make use of the Gini coefficient,
1 while Lambert and Ramos
(1997) use the mean logarithmic deviation. Second, we need not impose a homothetic social
evaluation function, as in Duclos and Lambert (2000). They adopt a different view as they
apply non-parametric techniques to estimate conditional density functions. They also replace
the tax system by a constant-welfare schedule to measure vertical redistribution (VR) and
capture HI as the per capita revenue gain that would have followed. Instead, we apply non-
parametric regression techniques in order to isolate the horizontal inequity from the vertical
redistribution and we adopt the classical constant-revenue schedule.
Under this methodology, the decompositions of Aronson et al. (1994) and the Lambert
and Ramos 'pure' approach (1997) are validated. These are particular cases when the non-
parametric estimation adopts the particular regressogram form over the given exogenous non-
overlapping intervals and the specific Gini or Theil 0 indices are used, respectively. We
justify the extension of these indices to the wider set of general S-convex inequality indices.
2
Finally, the proposed methodology is applied to micro-data drawn from the Spanish
taxpayers Instituto de Estudios Fiscales panel data for the year 1994.
The structure of the paper is as follows. A graphical representation of the HI concept is
supplied in Section 2. In Section 3, we suggest how to approximate the theoretical curve and
propose a solution to the identification problem of similar individuals by using non-
parametric methods with an appealing economic interpretation. In Section 4, we define the
measure of HI, derive the normative properties in terms of Lorenz domination and
1 In fact, in the non-overlapping intervals context, the Gini coefficient is additively decomposable.
2 A measure I: R
n
+ + →R is S-convex if I(Y)≥I(BY), for all of the bistochastic matrix B. A matrix is considered
bistochastic when it is squared, all of its elements belong to the interval [0, 1] and they add up to 1 by rows and
columns.
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces4
decompose the redistributive effect of the tax system into vertical and horizontal components.
Section 5 reinterprets the Aronson et al. (1994) and Lambert and Ramos (1997) 'pure'
approach decompositions. In Section 6, an illustration is shown. Finally, Section 7 consists of
conclusions.
2. Graphical notion of horizontal inequity
We start by providing an intuitive understanding of the HI notion used throughout this
paper. This idea has been developed in some papers, such as Lambert and Parker (1997) and
Jenkins and Lambert (1999). First, we compare Figures 1 and 2, which show the scatter plot
of the pre-tax income (X) and the post-tax income (Y) for two polar cases. In Figure 1, we
depict the post-tax incomes of homogeneous individuals for a proportional tax system. All
individuals are treated equally by this tax system. Zero HI is involved. A clear one-to-one (or
functional) relationship between pre- and post-tax income arises in this case. In contrast, in
Figure 2, we present the post-tax equivalent income values derived either from a tax system
where tax deductions are considered or from a monotone tax system with heterogeneous
individuals. Both cases in Figure 2 generate HI.
3 It can be seen how similar individuals
receive different fiscal treatments according to their equivalent income. The one-to-one
functional relationship is no longer satisfied. The key questions are whether there is a one-to-
one relationship, and what the intensity of such a relationship is.
3Figures are generated with micro-data from the Spanish taxpayers IEF Panel data. Details are provided in
Section 6.
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Figure 1: Pre-tax and Post-tax income distributions under proportional tax
We attempt to answer these questions using a regression curve, as in Figure 3, that
presents the estimated (theoretical) value of the post-tax income associated with a given pre-
tax income. This is the postulated one-to-one function between these variables. The more
dispersed are the values of the post-tax incomes, the higher the HI produced by the tax
system. Hence, deviations from the theoretical curve capture the notion of HI, and the slope
of the theoretical curve itself captures the notion of vertical progressivity.
3. Non-parametric solutions
The theoretical function can be approximated either by parametric or non-parametric
estimation. Whereas the parametric approach assumes that the estimated curve and, therefore,
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Figure 2: Pre-tax and Post-tax income distributions under actual tax
the tax system, have some pre-specified functional form, the non-parametric approach
estimates the response without reference to a specific form. This is more realistic in the




+ +  be the pre-tax equivalent income distribution and Y∈ R
n
+ +  be the post-tax
equivalent income distribution. The non-parametric smoothing of the data set basically
consists in computing the mean of the response variables near a point x. This local average is
constructed in such a way that it is defined only from observations in a neighbourhood
around x, since Y observations from points far away from x will have very different means.
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Given the pre-tax and post-tax income observation vectors  1...n i i)} {(X =  and  1...n i i)} {(Y = ,







1 - ) ( W n ) Z( i h i Y x x (1)
where 1...n i h i, )} ( {W = x  denotes a sequence of weights which may depend on the whole vector
1...n i i)} {(X = . The size of the weights is parameterized by the bandwidth h, which defines the
domain of  1...n i h i, )} ( {W = x from Xi-h to Xi+h. The larger the bandwidth, the smoother the
Figure 3: Bistochastic non-parametric estimation
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estimates of the regression curve. If we estimate the curve at n points, no matter where each x
is located, the result of the non-parametric smoothing estimation is a continuous and smooth
function Z. It can be expressed in vector notation by Z=W·Y, where W is the weight matrix.
The bandwidth parameter h is chosen to minimize a distance measure like the mean
integrated squared error. One advantage of this optimization process is that the non-
parametric estimation (in line with Duclos and Lambert, 2000 and Ramos and Lambert,
2002) overcomes the identification problem. The choice of similar individuals no longer
results from the division of individuals’ incomes into arbitrary intervals.
4 Duclos and
Lambert (2000) and Ramos and Lambert (2002) apply non-parametric methods to estimate
conditional density functions, but they do not provide a theoretical economic justification for
the use of the non-parametric technique. Unlike these authors, we apply non-parametric
smoothing to estimate regression curves. Moreover, we provide an economic interpretation
on the use of the non-parametric method.
5
Let us consider the following example. We assume that there is a distribution of four
individuals with pre-tax income levels of 400, 500, 500 and 2000, respectively. Suppose that
after the tax is imposed, the income levels become 350, 400, 400 and 1500, respectively. In
the close-equals framework, whether HI exists depends very much on how similar or
different these individuals are in the initial distribution. It is clear that individuals 2 and 3 are
equals and, therefore, close-equals. Nonetheless, we have doubts about the rest of the
distribution (i.e., about the relationship between individuals 1 and 2, or individuals 1 and 3).
In fact, there is a no clear positive criterion to answer this question. We propose to use a
widespread statistically based criterion rather than leave it to the subjective researcher's
criterion. In particular, we suggest the use of the non-parametric smoothing optimal
4 This is the general criterion applied by the close-equals approach. Alternatively, Jenkins (1988) proposes the
use of partitions comprising members who share the same pre-tax money income and the same type of 'fair'
characteristics.
5 van de Ven et al. (2001) provide an interpretation of the size of disjoint intervals, in the context of the
redistributive effect decomposition of Aronson et al. (1994).
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bandwidth criterion. Although it is not perfect, this criterion, which is common in all
statistical literature, has important positive properties, as outlined below. The optimal
bandwidth will determine which of the individuals are similar, and in turn, whether or not
there is HI in the above example. However, how is the optimal bandwidth worked out and
what is the rationale behind it?
Non-parametric regression takes into account two elements: first, a good fit or
approximation to the 'true' curve, which means a low bias (the difference between the actual
and the expected estimated value); and second, the reduction of the volatility of the estimates
(the variance is the standard criterion to measure volatility). These two elements have a
conflicting interpretation in terms of equity. The smaller the size of the intervals or the
bandwidth parameter h, the lower the bias is. In this case, the probability of considering
individuals with fairly close incomes to be different, increases. At the limit, all individuals
with different incomes are essentially different and, therefore, there are no close-equals. In
this case, if there is any HI, it is due to the exact equals. On the contrary, the larger the size of
the interval, the lower the variance is. In this case, the probability of considering individuals
with fairly different incomes to be similar, increases. At the limit, all individuals are similar
and the HI is at its maximum.
Optimal bandwidth is computed as a balance between both elements. Standard
statistical procedures propose to minimize a very common error function, the Mean
Integrated Quadratic Error or some of its variants (i.e., the Average Squared Error). Notice
that all these error measures are equivalent in asymptotic terms, so they should all have
roughly the same minimum and similar optimal bandwidth (Härdle, 1990).
6
6 The reader will notice that a very general framework is established in this paper, where any bandwidth
selection method is possible. Instead, some restrictions on bandwidth choice could be applied. These further
restrictions do not contradict the fundamentals of this paper. They may only restrict the set of techniques that
could be used. Indeed, we have imposed some restrictions in the empirical application (see Section 6).
Nevertheless, discussion about the most appropriate technique for the close-equals definition can be relegated to
future research.
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There are many non-parametric estimation methods in the literature. Here we
concentrate on the bistochastic non-parametric estimator (Rodríguez and Salas, 2001). This
smoother is a general class of non-parametric estimators that uses a bistochastic weight
matrix W.
7 A well-known result in the inequality literature is that given two distributions, A
and B, B can be obtained from A by a set of progressive (Lorenz-improving) transfers if and
only if there exists a bistochastic (which is not a permutation) matrix C such that B=CA (see
Dasgupta et al., 1973). Recall that a bistochastic matrix is a square matrix with non-negative
elements, whose rows and columns sum to one. As a consequence, the Lorenz curve for the
estimated variable Z lies above the Lorenz curve for the dependent variable Y, and both Z
and Y have the same mean, independent of the sample size. Moreover, the bistochastic non-
parametric estimation can be extended to the multidimensional regression case.
A special case of the bistochastic non-parametric estimator, which will have some
relevance below in Section 5, is the regressogram proposed by Tukey (1947). The
regressogram is an average of the dependent variables Y for which the corresponding Xs fall
into disjoint bins (Härdle, 1990). The graphical representation is a step function as depicted in
Figure 4.
7The bistochastic non-parametric estimator is basically a bistochastic normalisation of a non-parametric







1) and non-negative, on X.
Most non-parametric methods in the literature satisfy this condition, such as the kernel or the k-nearest
neighbour methods.
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Figure 4: Regressogram estimation
4. HI measurement and decomposition
In this section, we tackle the central points of the paper. First, we provide a partial
ordering approach to the horizontal inequity measurement, and second, we decompose the
total redistribution effect of a tax into vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity by
assuming a particular cardinalization.
4.1. The ordinal view of HI
Let Z∈ R
n
+ +  be the estimated equivalent income distribution using a non-parametric
technique. We define horizontal inequity HI(X,Y) as a function HI: R
n 2
+ + → R+  {0}.
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Positive horizontal inequity exists whenever there is any deviation of the actual post-tax
income distribution from the estimated post-tax regression curve.
In this respect, we can define the following second-order stochastic dominance criterion
to measure HI: given X, HI is positive if Z (weakly) Lorenz dominates Y (see Figure 5). That
is,
Z ≥L Y ⇒ HI(X,Y) ≥ 0 (2)
This is a reasonable assumption, as otherwise, intersections of Z and Y Lorenz curves
could conflict with an ambiguous interpretation of HI or, even worse, the Y Lorenz curve
could dominate the Z Lorenz curve, which would produce a negative HI, even when the post-
tax incomes are dispersed and horizontal inequities do exist. Therefore, the HI of a tax system
is the positive 'distance' between the Lorenz curve for the theoretical post-tax income
distribution (Lz) and the Lorenz curve for the post-tax income distribution (LY), as illustrated
in Figure 5.
Let Z* ∈ R
n
+ +  be the estimated income distribution using a bistochastic non-parametric
technique. In this case, it is guaranteed that Z* Lorenz dominates Y (Z* ≥L Y). Therefore, the
bistochastic non-parametric estimation is a sufficient condition for HI to be positive.
Moreover, given X and any two post-tax equivalent income distributions Y and Y', with
different estimated distributions Z* and Z*':
If Y ≥L Y' and Z*' ≥L Z*, then HI(X,Y') ≥ HI(X,Y) (3)
In this case, Y' is more dispersed around the theoretical income distribution Z*' than is
Y around Z*, so the HI has to be greater for Y'. Now, we introduce a principle that imposes a
minimum requirement that the HI measure must satisfy. Formally this principle can be stated
as follows:
E2004/0113
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Now, we will prove that under any HIRT, Y' (weakly) Lorenz dominates Y and
Z*'=Z*, so horizontal inequity is definitely reduced.
Lemma 1: Non-parametric estimated income distributions do not change under any HIRT.
Consider any pre-tax income distribution X ∈ R
n
+ + , any post-tax income distribution Y ∈
R
n
+ + , and let Z* ∈ R
n
+ +  be the non-parametric estimated income distribution. In addition, let
Y' and Z*' ∈ R
n
+ +  be the actual and estimated post-tax income distributions generated by
applying any HIRT to Y, respectively. Then Z*'=Z*.
The proof results from the fact that the estimated income distribution Z* does not
change, because the non-parametric weights depend only on the pre-tax income distribution,
X, in which persons i and j have the same pre-tax income, and therefore the same weight in
the estimation of Z*(x). As a result, variations in distribution Y after the transfer cancel each
other out. It is simple to verify this:








t t = + + = ∑
≠
=
The reader will notice that this lemma is also valid for all of the non-parametric estimators Z
defined in (1).
Proposition 1: Non-parametric partial HI ordering is consistent with the HIRT principle.
Formally, consider any pre-tax income distribution X ∈ R
n
+ + and any post-tax income
distribution Y ∈ R
n
+ + , and let Z* ∈ R
n
+ +  be the estimated income distribution using a
bistochastic non-parametric technique. In addition, let Y' and Z*' ∈ R
n
+ +  be the actual and
estimated post-tax income distributions generated by applying any HIRT to Y, respectively.
E2004/0115
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Then, HI(X,Y) ≥ HI(X,Y') for any HI measure satisfying the partial ordering defined in
expressions (2) and (3).
The proof is based on the fact that in this case Y' (weakly) Lorenz dominates Y, Y' ≥L Y,
and Z*'=Z* (Lemma 1). So, for bistochastic non-parametric estimates, it is verified that:
Z*' L Z* ≥L Y' ≥L Y
Then, any HI measure consistent with the partial ordering defined in expressions (2) and (3)
is reduced to:
Z*' L Z* ≥L Y' ≥L Y ⇒ HI(X,Y) ≥ HI(X,Y')
We may notice that in this context, Z* can be seen as the theoretical (benchmark) HI-
free distribution. In fact, it can be proved that Z* converges on the most favourable post-tax
equivalent income distribution obtainable under a set of HIRT. For limited size samples, Z*
can be easily proved to be only an upper bound to the distribution obtained by HIRT. It is, in
any case, a reasonable benchmark to characterize the HI-free distribution.
Furthermore, we can state the following result on the HI change under different tax
systems:
Proposition 2: Given any pre-tax income distribution, X, two associated tax systems, S0 and
S1, and two post-tax income distributions, Y0 and Y1, respectively,
8 HI does not increase, for
any HI measure satisfying the partial ordering defined in expressions (2) and (3), if and only
if, Y1 is not Lorenz-dominated by Y0 and 
*
0 Z is not Lorenz-dominated by 
*
1 Z :
8Eventually, we may have two different pre-tax income distributions, X0 and X1, without affecting the
generality of the proposition.
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Therefore, if there is some ambiguity regarding the HI change, it is only because there is no
such Lorenz-dominance.
There is an obvious link with welfare analysis. Within our framework a horizontal
reducing transfer increases welfare, according to any individual social welfare function that is
increasing and S-concave. This is because the average incomes of Y, Y' and Z* are the same
under the bistochastic non-parametric estimation and also because the estimated post-tax
income distribution Z* does not change, while Y' (weakly) Lorenz dominates the post-tax
income distribution Y.
The theoretical (estimated) post-tax income distribution Z* is always as preferred as the
observed post-tax income distribution Y and Y'. Formally, we state the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Consider any pre-tax income distribution X ∈ R
n
+ +  and any post-tax income
distribution Y ∈ R
n
+ + . Let Y' be another post-tax income distribution, generated from Y by
means of a horizontal inequity reducing transfer, and let Z* be generated by any bistochastic
non-parametric estimation. Then:
) ( ) ' ( *) ( Y SEF Y SEF Z SEF ≥ ≥
for any SEF(·) individual social evaluation function that is increasing and ordinal S-concave
in income levels. The proof uses  Z Y Y µ µ µ = = '  (under the bistochastic estimation) and
Z* ≥L Y' ≥L Y (under the HIRT principle). An application of the theorems of Atkinson (1970)
and Dasgupta et al. (1973) obtains the result.
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Moreover, overall welfare reduction due to an HIRT is entirely induced by the HI
component, as the vertical component remains unchanged.
Up to this point, we have considered that any deviation of the observed post-tax income
distribution from the estimated post-tax income distribution implies HI. However, there are
tax breaks, which serve long-term social goals, that can provoke deviations and, therefore,
horizontal inequity. Nevertheless, we should not consider these deviations as HI because they
are desirable from a social perspective. At this stage, it would be possible to adopt a
multidimensional approach to take into account not only those tax breaks, but also those
which deserve the attention of tax administrators or interest groups, in line with Ramos and
Lambert (2002). Although, in principle, we can extend our approach to a multidimensional
framework, this is beyond the goal of this paper.
4.2 The vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity components
The vertical and overall redistribution distance concept can be rationalized in the
following sense. The distance between the Lorenz curve for the pre-tax income (LX) and the
Lorenz curve for the post-tax income (LY), which represents the total effect of the tax system
on the original distribution of income, can be decomposed into two different elements: the
vertical redistribution and the HI. The vertical redistribution is the distance between the
Lorenz curve for the pre-tax income (LX) and the Lorenz curve for the theoretical (estimated)
post-tax income (LZ*), whereas the HI is represented by the residual distance from LZ* to LY.
Given any pre-tax equivalent income distribution X ∈ R
n
+ +  and any post-tax equivalent
income distribution Y∈ R
n
+ + , with an estimated distribution Z*∈ R
n
+ + , we adopt the
following cardinalization to obtain an additive decomposition of the overall redistribution
effect, RE, into the vertical redistribution, VR, and horizontal inequity HI:






+ + →R is an S-convex inequality index. Then, total redistribution can be written as
RE=VR-HI. This methodology follows the literature that additively decomposes RE into VR
and HI. However, we generalize this literature as we can make use of any S-convex
inequality index I(·) without losing economic meaning.
5. A reinterpretation of some classical decompositions of the RE
In this section, we point out the links between the proposed methodology and some
alternative decompositions. As we see below, the normative implications in terms of Lorenz
domination that were pointed out in Subsection 4.1 are features shared by the reranking
approach of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) and also by the close-equals approach of
Aronson et al. (1994) and Lambert and Ramos (1997). However, some shortcomings arise
when implementing these methods. The connections between our approach and the close-
equals approach are analysed in Subsection 5.1, and links with the reranking approach are
highlighted in Subsection 5.2.
5.1 Close-equals approach and non-parametric modelling
The main decompositions of RE within the close-equals approach can be found in the
literature, such as Aronson et al. (1994) and Lambert and Ramos (1997). An interesting
question arises: is the use of those approaches an implicit way of applying a non-parametric
model? If so, what is the explicit underlying non-parametric model?
To answer these questions, we start with the Lambert and Ramos (1997) 'pure' approach
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decomposition of the redistributive effect RELR:
HI VR RELR − =
) ( ) (
,
0 0 Y T X T VR
S B − =













W,S denote the between- and the within-groups mean logarithmic deviation
inequality indices (Theil-0), evaluated in the usual manner, under the given income brackets
that generate a disjoint exhaustible partition S into p subgroups. T0
W,i denotes the within-i-
subgroup Theil-0 inequality index, where ni is the population in the i-subgroup and n is the
total population. We give an interpretation of this methodology in terms of the theoretical HI-
free distribution that was provided in Subsection 4.1.
According to the definitions in Section 4, the Lambert and Ramos (1997)
decomposition is equivalent to a particular econometric model with both vertical
redistribution terms equal to:
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
,
0 0 Y T X T Z I X I VR
S B − = − =
When we consider the mean logarithmic deviation as the inequality index in our model,
the estimated post-tax income inequality and the actual between-groups post-tax inequality
are the same, which is guaranteed if the estimated post-tax income equals the mean post-tax
income for each close-equals group:
) ( ) ( ,
,
0 0 Y T Z T i Z
S B
i i = ⇒ ∀ = µ
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces20
where Zi and  i µ  are the estimated distribution and the mean post-tax income in the subgroup
i, respectively. If we recall the definition of the regressogram in Section 3, we can conclude
that the Lambert and Ramos (1997) decomposition of RE is equivalent to this particular non-
parametric technique, when the mean logarithmic deviation index is applied.
This relationship can be extended to the decomposition of RE proposed by Aronson et
al. (1994):
∑ − − − = R Y G
n
n
Y G X G RE
i W i i S B




By using the Gini index (G), Aronson et al. (1994) represent the three-terms decomposition
of RE above into vertical, horizontal and reranking contributions. G
B,S(Y) is the between-
groups inequality of the post-tax income, G
W,i(Y) is the Gini index of the within-i-subgroup,
µ  is the post-tax income mean value and R is an index of reranking from the pre- to post-tax
income distribution, which is closely related to that of Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981).
Similar conclusions can be obtained if we apply the above procedure to the Aronson et
al. (1994) decomposition, using the Gini coefficient.
The decomposition provided by Tukey’s non-parametric smoothing achieves the same
results as both the 'pure' approach of Lambert and Ramos’s (1997) decomposition and of
Aronson et al.'s (1994) decomposition of RE, depending on the inequality index applied.
Therefore, both decompositions of RE are particular cases obtained by the regressogram.
Moreover, we propose and can justify the use of any S-convex inequality index, even within
the regressogram context, to provide a more general view of HI.
So far we have assumed fixed-width intervals. However, windows may well be
variable, such as quantiles of the population. In that case, both decompositions of RE – both
the 'pure' Lambert and Ramos (1997) approach and Aronson et al.'s (1994) decomposition –
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can be seen as particular cases obtained by the statistically equivalent block regressogram.
9
The result is a new step function appropriate over a varying window length. Another
interesting possibility is the use of a local adaptation of a smoothing parameter (see for
example, Friedman, 1984).
A relevant issue emerges when both methods of decomposition are considered as
particular cases of the regressogram decomposition of RE. The application of a regressogram
implies working with a bistochastic matrix of weights, as this technique is a special case of
the bistochastic non-parametric estimator (see Rodríguez and Salas, 2001). Therefore, the
normative implications in terms of the Lorenz domination, which were developed in
Subsection 4.1, are shared by both decomposition methods.
In summary, our method adds to the current literature by providing two general results.
First, the regressogram is one particular non-parametric method and we allow for the use of
many non-parametric techniques other than the simple regressogram. Indeed, the
regressogram is, by definition, a discontinuous step function that might hide particular
features of the distributions within the intervals. To this end, it is worth noting the difference
between the post-tax income distribution estimated according to the regressogram (Figure 4),
and the one obtained by the bistochastic kernel estimator, as shown in Figure 3. Second, even
in the regressogram case, we found it justifiable to use not only the Theil 0 index or the Gini
coefficient, but any ordinal S-convex index.
5.2 The relation between the non-parametric approach and the reranking-based HI
measures
Reranking-based decomposition analysis measures the vertical income component
9 This is, in fact, a k-Nearest Neighbours non-parametric estimation analogue to the regressogram. The k-
Nearest Neighbours (k-NN) estimate is a weighted average in a varying neighbourhood. When the independent
variable is chosen from an equidistant grid, kernel and k-NN have equivalent weights. See Härdle (1990) for a
complete description of this non-parametric technique.
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caused by the tax system, using the 'distance' between the post-tax income concentration
curve (Ly,x) and the pre-tax income Lorenz curve (Lx). In addition, it measures the HI by the
'distance' between the post-tax income concentration curve (Ly,x) and the post-tax income
Lorenz curve (Ly).
However, as proven above, we establish that the overall redistribution effect can be
decomposed under our approach into a vertical redistribution (the distance from Lx to Lz*)
and a horizontal inequity component (the distance from Lz* to Ly). To this end, both
methodologies have points in common. Both are based on the existence of a theoretical
benchmark HI-free distribution from which the RE can be decomposed into the VR and HI
components. In our case, this benchmark is the non-parametrically estimated Lz*, whereas in
the reranking approach it is the concentration curve Lx,y.
Moreover, the post-tax concentration curve always lies above the post-tax Lorenz curve
in the reranking approach. Similarly, the estimated post-tax income Lorenz curve dominates
the post-tax income Lorenz curve in our approach. However, no unambiguous relationship
between Lz* and Lx,y can be established. Thus, we cannot make such a direct comparison
between the reranking and the non-parametric approaches.
6. An illustration
This section applies the proposed methodology to micro-data drawn from the Spanish
taxpayers IEF panel data for the year 1994. The sample size comprises 5,386 taxpayers. The
equivalent income Y
e is computed using the Buhmann et al. (1988) and the Coulter et al.
(1992) parametric equivalence scale, 
5 . 0 N
Y
Y
e = = = = , where N is the household size.
10 We assign
the same population weight to each member of the household. This illustration does not deal
with the statistical inference problems pointed out by Davidson and Duclos (2000). In
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addition, we ignore the measurement errors due to contaminated data that were dealt with in
Cowell and Victoria-Feser (1996). Following Härdle (1990, p. 162), optimal bandwidth is
obtained by eliminating the extreme five per cent of the population in each tail of the
distribution to avoid 'oversmoothing'.
The results are summarized in Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 and in Table 1. In Table 1, the main
results for the bistochastic kernel estimation are presented. We observe HI indices for a
variety of S-convex inequality indices, which are all non-negative. In addition, we present the
results for the simple regressogram case. The methodologies of Aronson et al. (1994) and
Lambert and Ramos (1997) are particular cases where the Gini coefficient and the mean
logarithmic deviation are evaluated. We extend the results for alternative indices, which
allows us to observe how sensitive the vertical and horizontal proportions are with respect to
the inequality aversion parameter. Further, we verify that in this case the results are robust for
the non-parametric technique used.
Moreover, this methodology could be further exploited in the analysis of tax reforms as
unanimous change for all indices is only produced under strict Lorenz dominance between
the non-parametrically estimated distributions. If non-parametrically estimated Lorenz curves
do intersect, we can always have S-convex indices predicting conflicting results.
7. Conclusions
The central proposals of this paper are first, a partial ordering view of HI, and second, a
cardinalization, which provides a general decomposition of the total redistribution effect into
vertical redistribution and horizontal inequity.
First, HI is ordinally measured consistently with the distance between the theoretical
income distribution benchmark (estimated according to the bistochastic non-parametric
10 We have checked for other equivalence scales (N
0.25 and N
0.75), and there is no substantial change in the
results.
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technique) and the actual post-tax income Lorenz curve. This approach allows us to measure
HI using a variety of S-convex indices instead of a particular inequality index. This
methodology is consistent with the so-called horizontal inequity transfer principle, which
imposes a normative minimum requirement that any HI measure must satisfy. In fact, the
estimated distribution can be seen as the theoretical benchmark HI-free distribution, which is
the most equitable post-tax equivalent income distribution in the Lorenz sense.
Second, we adopt a setting that allows us to decompose the total effect of the tax
system on the original distribution of income into two different elements. The first element is
the welfare gain due to the HI-free income redistribution, and the second is the unambiguous
welfare loss due to HI. It is important to note that the decomposition is achieved without any
requirement regarding additive decomposable inequality indices. More general and robust
sensitivity tests can then be carried out, due to the wider universe of inequality indices under
consideration.
In addition, we generalize the methodologies of Aronson et al. (1994) and the 'pure'
approach of Lambert and Ramos (1997) within this view. These methodologies correspond to
the cases when the non-parametric estimation adopts the particular regressogram form over
the given exogenous non-overlapping intervals. Even in this case, we can justify the use of
any S-convex inequality index. This suggests an attractive unifying and generalizing
framework.
Finally, we wish to emphasize that our proposal does not involve the usual limitation of
some existing indices, i.e., the arbitrary definition of similar individuals. This problem is
dealt with by the non-parametric estimation of the post-tax income distribution, as suggested
elsewhere in the literature. We have a particular economic interpretation of the solution to
this identification problem. The sizes of the intervals are endogenously obtained by the
optimal smoothing technique, which in fact optimizes the trade-off between the bias (short
intervals) and variance (large intervals) of the estimation.
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